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Public Policy and
Managerial Impact Section
How Do HMOs Achieve Savings?
The Effectiveness of One
Organization's Strategies
Ann Barry Mood, Allen M. Fremont, Kinamjin, DavidM. Bott,
Jiao Ding, and Robert C. Parker,Jr.
Objective. To examine how a group practice used organizational strategies rather
than provider-level incentives to achieve savings for health maintenance organization
(HMO) compared to fee-for-service (FFS) patients.
Data Sources/Study Setting. A large group practice with a group model HMO also
treating FFS patients. Data sources were all patient encounter records, demographic
files, and clinic records covering 3.5 years (1986-1989). The clinic's procedures to
record services and charges were identical for FFS and HMO patients. All FFS and
HMO patients under age 65 who received any outpatient services during approxi-
mately 100,000 episodes of the seven study illnesses were eligible.
Study Design. Using an explanatory case design, we first compared HMO and FFS
rates of resource utilization, in standardized dollars, which measured the impact
of organizational strategies to influence patient and provider behavior. We then
examined the effect ofHMO insurance and organizational measures to explain total
outpatient use. Key variables were standardized charges for all outpatient services and
the HMO's strategies.
Principal Findings. Patient and provider behavior responded to organizational strate-
gies designed to achieve savings for HMO patients; for instance, HMO patients
used midlevel providers and generalists more often and ER and specialists less often.
Overall HMO savings, adjusted for case mix, were explained by the specialty of the
physicians the patients first visited and appeared to affect patients with average health
more than others.
Conclusion. Organizational strategies, without resort to differential financial incen-
tives to each provider, resulted in lower rates of outpatient services forHMO patients.
Savings from outpatient use, especially for common diseases that rarely require hos-
pitalization, can be substantial.
Key Words. Managed care/HMO, financial incentives, organizational strategies,
episodes of care, resource utilization
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Health maintenance organiizations (HMOs), and managed care more broadly,
offer two auspicious promises: lower costs and better health. These promises
first gained widespread attention in the 1970s, bolstered by federal legislation
designed to facilitate development ofHMOs and by early research reporting
that HMO patients' outcomes are at least as good as the outcomes of their
fee-for-service (FFS) counterparts while HMOs spend less-especially by
reducing hospitalizations (Dorsey 1983; Hlatky et al. 1983; Luft 1978, 1981;
Manning et al. 1984; Wolinsky 1980).
Because these promises were widely accepted, most research compar-
ing HMOs and FFS addressed the question, How do HMOs achieve savings?
by examining differences in average rates of the services HMO and FFS
patients received, for example, visits or hospitalizations, adjusted for health
(Kralewski 1996; Martin et al. 1989; Miller and Luft 1994; Stearns, Wolfe,
and Kindig 1992; Udvarhelyi et al. 1991; Hellinger 1996). The presumption
underlying this approach was that knowing how HMOs save money requires
understanding how providers deploy services differently when confronted
with an HMO patient.
One reason why researchers focused on explaining differences in ser-
vices was that policymakers were basing health policy on the assumption
that HMOs spend less than FFS care because providers react to financial
incentives. FFS incentives, they presumed, push expenses higher than may
be necessary by rewarding use of the most profitable combination of services,
even when a positive impact on health is unlikely to occur. In contrast, HMO
incentives encourage using the lowest-cost approach to achieve satisfactory
health outcomes. Moreover, most usually assumed further that these incen-
tives operate primarily at the provider level(that each doctor is motivated
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to use the least costly resources when treating HMO patients and the most
profitable when treating FFS patients.
In reality, the financial risk associated with HMO care is almost always
borne by a group of providers or an insurance organization (Hillman, Pauly,
and Kerstein 1989; Gold, Nelson, Lake, et al. 1995). It is the group or
organization, rather than the individual provider, that is motivated to deliver
the least costly care to achieve an acceptable outcome. Therefore, in order
to truly understand how HMOs achieve their savings, it is crucial to identify
the strategies that successful organizations use to achieve their lower costs.
Two general hypotheses guide this study:
Hypothesis One. Organizational strategies that encourage desirable
behavior among HMO patients and providers will
result in lower resource utilization of services and in
greater use of generalists for HMO patients.
Hypothesis Two. Controlling for disease and case mix, lower total
resources for HMO episodes are largely explained
by the provider's specialty (which reflects organi-
zational strategies rather than provider-level in-
centives). A related sub-hypothesis is that HMO
practice style varies by patient health.
METHODS
STUDY DESIGN, PATIENT POPULATION,
AND MEASURES
We use an explanatory case design based on the experience of approximately
100,000 patients under age 65. The sample consisted of all consecutive
patients being treated for an episode of any of seven illnesses at Carle Clinic
Association of Urbana, Illinois during the 3.5-year study period. This large
group practice with its 220 providers representing 30 specialties offers an
unusual opportunity to study the impact of organizational strategies.
Although owning their own group model HMO, the Clinic's providers
treated both FFS and HMO patients-a situation typical for HMOs in the
1990s (Bernstein and Bernstein 1996; Group Health Association of Amer-
ica 1994). Also typical of many HMOs (Gold, Nelson, Lake, et al. 1995),
the Clinic remunerated its physicians based primarily on services rendered
without regard to patient insurance. However, because of their system for re-
muneration, the Clinic used identical procedures to inventory services for all
patients and initially recorded the uniform Clinic "charge" for a given type of
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service, regardless of provider or patient insurance. Thus, the approximately
1.5 million encounter records during the study period provided identical
information for all HMO and FFS services on the CPT-4 code (Clauser,
Fanta, and Finel 1984), its associated standard Clinic charge, the service-
provider, the HMO-assigned physician if any, and up to 12 diagnostic codes
for office-based services. To remove the effect of year, we also standardized
all charges to 1990 dollars using the Clinic's actual annual changes during the
study period.
Because prices of each type of service do not vary by provider, insur-
ance, or study year, comparisons ofHMO and FFS rates reflect differences
only in the quantity and mix of services used, not differences in prices paid. In
this setting, we can ignore several explanations for any differences in resources
spent because HMO and FFS data were recorded identically; HMO and
FFS patients had access to the same physicians and the same facilities; and
providers, at the individual level, had identical financial incentives.
Rationalefor Using Episodes ofAcute Diseases
The unit of analysis on which to compare resources used, particularly when
treatment crosses sites and involves multiple providers and services, is a theo-
retical and methodological challenge (cf. Hombrook, Hortado, andJohnson
1985; Wingert, Kralewski, and Lindquist 1995). We used an episode of illness
as the basic unit of analysis, capturing all visits and services ordered by any
Clinic providers during the course of treating several common problems.
Our primary focus was on outpatient services: visits (including emergency
room [ER] visits not resulting in hospitalization), procedures, and radiological
and laboratory services. We also captured other care delivered by a Clinic
provider, that is, in any hospital, nursing home, or other settings, so that we
could take such use into account in analyzing outpatient care. The choice
and definition of study diseases and the episode length were based on advice
from an expert panel of physicians, representative Clinic physicians, Clinic
administrators and data recorders, and preliminary analyses of the database.
We used a fixed-length model to define each episode, basing the length-from
four to six weeks-on the typical clinical course of the acute disease plus
time needed to capture follow-up care. We restricted our analyses to acute
diseases in order to minimize the possibility that FFS patients (facing no
financial disadvantage) would use non-Clinic providers whose services would
not therefore be captured in our database. We reasoned that patients were
unlikely to switch or supplement their care during the short course of a com-
mon, non-life-threatening disease. Where such outside use occurred, our data
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underestimated the true FFS resources used and therefore underestimated
any "savings" for HMO care.
Creating Episodes ofIllness: Patient
Eligibility and Data Sources
From January 1, 1986 through June 30, 1989, all patients treated as in- or
outpatients by any Clinic provider were eligible for inclusion. Three sources of
data were used. Demographic files provided patients' sex, age, and insurance
status during the episode. Clinic records provided information about the
HMO's strategies and the degree, specialty, and practice location for each
provider. Encounter records provided information about the date, charges,
and provider for all services used during the episode; they were also used to
create measures reflecting the patient's health based on diagnostic information
and evidence of poorer health established by receipt of any hospitalization
or major outpatient procedure.
To create an episode, we searched the encounter records for any of the
study's primary diagnoses associated with an office visit or special service (e.g.,
audiology test or physical therapy). Once identified, we collected information
on all professional services rendered to the patient during the requisite length
of the episode. For office visits and special services, we counted the number of
events and summed their associated charges for each service-provider. Thus
we know if the service was provided by the assigned physician (for HMO
patients), the first provider (for all patients), additional providers with the
same or different specialties, midlevel providers, or ER providers. We also
recorded professional charges associated with outpatient procedures and in-
or outpatient laboratory and radiological services. Nonambulatory services
such as hospitalization, nursing home visits, or home care were recorded but
were relatively rare given the study diseases chosen. Outpatient prescription
drugs, available only for HMO patients, were not analyzed here.
Table 1 displays for each study disease the International Classification
of Disease [ICD-9-CM] (1992) codes used to define primary and secondary
diagnoses, the episode length, and the number of episodes analyzed, as well
as the number of physicians who were first-providers during any episode.
The study diseases were selected because they were among the most com-
mon diseases treated with outpatient care at the Clinic and because they
involved multiple ages, both genders, several organ systems, and a variety of
specialties. Analyzing the data separately for each study disease offered two
advantages. We could control for the basic disease and check for consistency
in patterns across a set of common acute illnesses.
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Table 1: Basic Descriptors of Diseases: Diagnoses,
Number of Episodes in Study
Length, and
Importance Length * Final
Study to Define ICD-9-CM of Episodes
Diseasce Episode Codes* Episode < 65yrs. # MDs
Peptic ulcer Primary 531.0-533.9 6 weeks 1,125 90
Secondary 537.0 537.3 553.3 560.9 578.9
868.0
Esophagitis Primary 530.1 6 weeks 2,592 106
Secondary 537.0 537.3 553.3 560.9 578.9
868.0
Gastritis Primary 535.0-536.9 6 weeks 6,161 122
Secondary 537.0 537.3 553.3 560.9 578.9
868.0
Low back pain Primary 724.5 846.0 6 weeks 10,484 137
Secondary 447.6 715.0-715.9
Eczema Primary 692.9 4 weeks 16,748 126
Secondary 477.0-477.9 493.9 684 695.3
757.39
Acute otitis mediat Primary 382.9 V721 4 weeks 26,863 116
Secondary 462.0 465.0 465.9 473.9 486.0
Bronchitis Primary 466.0 487.1 4 weeks 29,904 125
Secondary 277.0 462.0 463.0 465.0 465.9
466.1 473.9 486.0 493.9
* These ICD-9-CM codes reflected actual usage at Carle Clinic. We selected codes imprinted on
the billing forms and then verified that they captured all usage by consulting with the head of
medical records and clinicians from different divisions at Carle and by analyzing a sample of
electronic billing records.
tWe analyze acute otitds media, defined by excluding patients with > three episodes within 6
months, > four within 12 months, or > five total.
As noted in Table 1, the final number of episodes per study disease
ranged from 1,125 (peptic ulcer) to 29,904 (bronchitis). We eliminated epi-
sodes whose data were time-censored, that is, where the episode began within
the first or last four to six weeks of the study period (6.7 percent of all episodes
created), had unidentified first providers (2.2 percent), involved Medicare or
Medicaid patients (30.6 percent), or began with a consultation CPT-4 code
(2.4 percent). Medicare patients were dropped because theirHMO plan had
a very different benefit structure and the charges were Medicare's allowable
charges rather than the Clinic's standard charges. Medicaid patients were
dropped because none had HMO insurance.
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In order to examine whether the four- to six-week length captured all
care for the study diseases, we performed patient-level analyses of the length
of time between episodes and the frequency of repeated episodes. Only otitis
media exhibited evidence of significant repetition. We removed patients with
an indication of chronic otitis media, based on the number of episodes within
a specified time frame (Bluestone and Klein 1988). We analyzed the remaining
60.8 percent of otitis episodes, accounting for 86.9 percent of the patients.
TWO TYPES OF ANALYSES
To examine Hypothesis One: the effectiveness of the Clinic's HMO strate-
gies, we created measures of resource usage corresponding to the desired
behavioral change for each strategy and compared rates used for HMO
and FFS episodes of each disease. The strategies are described in the next
section, and their corresponding measures are summarized in Table 3 (further
on). To examine whether these strategies resulted in lower total outpatient
expenditures for HMO patients, we used regression to adjust for within-
disease patient health factors when comparing HMO and FFS expenditures
and examined (1) whether the effect ofHMO insurance was constant across
different levels of illness and (2) whether the effect ofhavingHMO insurance
was explained by the types of specialties patients first visited.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES
AND THEIR MEASURES
Some ofthe organization's strategies focused on financial incentives and unob-
trusive controls such as the convenience ofvarious services for patients, while
other strategies used rules, normative comparisons, and praise or reprimand
to promote desirable responses in providers.
The financial incentives aimed at HMO patients required them to pay
$10 for each visit to a physician, which was waived for services provided by
midlevel providers or expanded to $50 if services were provided in the ER
The Clinic's HMO also encouraged HMO patients to see generalists, which
it accomplished in three ways. First, all HMO patients had to select a "gate-
keeper" physician from among a designated pool of Clinic providers. This
strategy encouraged the use of generalists by eliminating patient self-referrals
and excluding most subspecialties from the designated pool. Second, although
the pool included subspecialists (e.g., oncologists and cardiologists), newly en-
rolled patients found that generalists-particularly family practitioners-were
readily available while subspecialists' practices were usually full. And finally,
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HMO patients tended to prefer to be treated at branch clinics, where gener-
alists practiced.
This third factor had other implications as well. The Clinic expanded
its branch clinics to seven during the early 1980s, in part to encourage
membership in its HMO as well as to ensure referrals to its main clinic for
specialist care. The convenience of branch clinics is a double-edged sword
for patients. While the distance they travel to the branch for office visits is
reduced, their total distance and inconvenience is increased when they need
services available only at the main clinic, such as specialist care or specialized
procedures. While few have compared utilization patterns at branch versus
main clinics, some have studied the effect of inconvenience of access, often
measured by distance, as a predictor of lower use (cf. Gold 1981; Goodman
et al. 1997). We use branch to indicate easier access to generalists and more
difficult access to main clinic specialty care.
Although this HMO did not use provider-level financial incentives
to influence providers, it used other organizational strategies to influence
their behavior. First, HMO patient records were easily identified by mark-
ers on their charts that were designed to ensure prospective collection of
copayments. Through mechanisms such as educational appeals to practice
cost-effectively, monitoring and feedback of rates of services, and praise or
reprimand for exceptional performance, the HMO encouraged physicians to
exercise control over costly resources. Although clearly identified as orig-
inating from the HMO, the educational appeals focused on the general
philosophy of providing cost-effective choices for all patients regardless of
insurance. In contrast, specific feedback, such as rates of specific services
per member per month and letters of praise or reprimand for providers'
performance in managing their patients' care, was restricted to HMO patient
care. Another strategy was to encourage providers to assume direct oversight
of most of their patients' care and especially to avoid overusing specialists.
STATISTICAL METHODS
To test for differences in disease-specific rates ofservices used to treatHMO or
FFS patients, we used Pearson's x2 for rates based on dichotomous variables
and student's t-test for rates based on counts or sums. When adjusting for
within-disease differences, we used multiple regression. We used the natural
logarithm of total resources in standardized 1990 dollars in regressing total
outpatient resources in order to minimize the effect of outlier cases as well as
to control for year, provider, and insurance.
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RESULTS
Table 2 displays basic differences in patients across each study disease. As
expected, the mean total outpatient resources expended during an episode
varied considerably by disease. Mean expenditures varied threefold, ranging
from $68 for eczema to $271 for ulcer. In contrast, the mean number of visits
varied little; while the maximum observed ranged from 5 for ulcer to 16 for
low back pain, the mean number of visits per episode was slightly above one.
Approximately half of the episodes across all study diseases involved
HMO-insured patients. The means for health-related factors, used when
adjusting for within-disease differences in the health of patients, varied pre-
dictably across the diseases. For example, the mean age for patients under age
65 reflected that acute otitis media most typically occurred among the very
young while bronchitis and eczema included both young and older patients.
Hypothesis One. DoHMO Organizational Strategies Affect Outpatient
Resources?
Table 2: Basic Characteristics of Study Patients by Disease Episodes
Low Acute
Peptic Esopha- Back Otitis Bron-
Uker gitis Gastritus Pain Eczema Media chitis
Outpatient Resources Per Episode
Mean total $ (in standardized 271.07 246.27 194.80 187.16 68.08 77.12 69.54
1990 $) includes visits*, tests, and
procedures
Mean total no. of visits 1.20 1.29 1.28 1.32 1.16 1.22 1.18
[maximum per episode] [51 [71 [81 [161 [7] [6] [9]
Patient Characteristics DuringEpisode
Insurance: % insured by HMO 54 46 53 52 63 47 57
Health-related factors (case mix):
Mean age (maximum: 64.9 years) 42.75 37.63 37.68 38.01 23.94 11.04 24.34
Sex (% female) 53 59 61 57 65 66 66
Mean no. secondary diagnoses .04 .07 .02 .01 .04 .20 .32
Mean no. unrelated diagnoses 1.30 1.23 0.99 0.45 0.33 0.32 0.48
Mean no. prior episodes, same .31 .36 .36 .36 .31 .47 .39
disease
% with any outpatient procedure 11 7 4 1 1 1 0
%with anyrelatedhospitalization 8 5 3 1 0 0 1
*Visits consisted of office services (CPT-4 codes 90000-80, 90500-699; 99058-64, 99160-74)
and special services (90701-99056, 99065-140, 99175-99).
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To examine the effect of the organizational strategies to try to influence
patient or provider behavior, we compared the rates of services used by
HMO and FFS patients. Table 3 summarizes organizational strategies used
by the Clinic's HMO either to reward cost-effective usage or to discourage
ineffective uses by patients and providers. It also displays related rates of
utilization by HMO and FFS patient episodes.
Table 3: Comparing HMO and FFS Utilization by HMO
Organizational Strategies
Uker Eophagtit
FFS HMO FFS HMO
n = 515,t n = 610 n = 1,409 n = 1,183
HMO Organizational Strategis to Corresponding Episode-Level
Affect Appropriate Use Utilization Ratesfor FFS andHMO
Patients
* Aimed at Patients
Use copays to influence use:
1. Lower if midlevel provider
2. Higher if ER
Encourage generalist care
* Aimed at Patient
% used midlevel provider
% used ER
4 ever visited adult medicine,
family practice, or pediatrician
Branch and cost-effective
strategies:
1. More generalists at branches % used branch
2. Less convenient access Mean no. of different days to
receive all services during
episode
Encourage use of assigned For HMO only, % visited
primary care MD assigned provider during
episode
Aimed at Providers * Aimed at Providers
Encourage cost-effective ancillary Mean $ spent on radiology, lab,
services or outpatient procedures
Encourage cost-effective no. visits Mean no. of visits
Encourage primary provider to
give care:
1. Less cross-coverage % used cross-coveraget
2. Fewer specialists % visited specialist (except ER)
3. Fewer referrals
any time during episode
% visited specalist (except ER)
after initial visit
1.4 3.6 1.1 3.5*
7.0 4.6 5.2 5.5
67.6 86.7* 73.3 83.4*
37.7 59.3* 34.6 51.3*
2.5 2.3 2.2 2.5*
- 70.5 - 72.7
275.5 147.1* 188.7 150.7
1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3
1.0 8.4* 1.5 9.8*
27.6 1 1.0* 24.1 14.5*
1.9 4.1 1.9 5.6*
* Indicates that differences between HMO and FFS episodes were significant at p < .001. Tests
for significance were based on x2 for percentages and t-tests for means.
t Cross-coverage was defined as care by a provider with the same specialty as the HMO
gatekeeper or as the first MD seen for FFS.
: n = number of episodes.
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Consistent with the organizational incentives for patients, the rates
in Table 3 show that HMO patients used midlevel providers more often
(significant for five), the ER less often (significant for five), and generalists
and branch clinics more often (significant for all), and that they spent more
days receiving their care (significant for six, although significantly fewer for
back pain). Interestingly, HMO patients did not always see their assigned
Gastritis Back Pain Eczrma Otitis Media Bronhitis
FFS HMO FFS HMO FFS HMO FFS HMO FFS HMO
n =2,918 n =3,243 n =5,081 n =5,403 n =6,271 n = 10,477 n = 14,157 n = 12,706 n = 12,881 n = 17,023
2.7
9.7
77.0
6.8* 4.3
6.2* 7.7
88.0* 55.0
4.5 5.2
4.2* 8.9
87.5* 72.7
7.5* 2.2
3.9* 11.7
80.3* 86.6
5.3* 7.2
7.9* 13.2
90.8* 84.4
11.4*
7.4*
912.6*
52.3 58.1* 45.5 64.4* 40.0 43.6* 33.8 38.0* 57.5 54.8*
2.1 2.4* 2.4 2.3* 1.6 1.8* 1.7 1.9* 1.6 1.7*
- 71.4 - 68.6
154.7 118.0* 136.3 11 1.5* 22.1 27.3 32.1 23.7* 24.9 26.7
1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2* 1.2 1.1*
1.1 11.5* 1.4 13.6* 1.3 13.1* 5.0 22.9* 3.3 19.9*
14.6 7.3* 40.1 11.4* 20.6 19.5 3.6 3.1 3.6 2.7*
0.6 2.0* 2.8 9.0* 1.9 18.3* 1.2 1.8* 0.3 1.0*
- 57.7 - 59.5 - 59.7
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physician, ranging from only 58 percent of eczema episodes to 73 percent for
esophagitis.
The bottom of Table 3 focuses on strategies to influence provider be-
havior. Ancillary services were less expensive forHMO episodes (significant
in four diseases), but had little effect on visits (significantly fewer for two
diseases). HMO episodes experienced significantly higher rates of cross-
coverage (significant for all), were less likely to see a specialist (defined as
a medical subspecialist or surgeon) at any time during the episode (significant
for five diseases), but were more likely to be referred to a specialist (where
referral to a specialist required a prior visit to another type of physician)
(significant for six diseases).
Overall these results support Hypothesis One, but some results deserve
discussion. We argued that the convenience of branch clinics is coupled with
greater inconvenience for the patient in receiving specialty care at the main
clinic. This may explain why HMO patients typically required more days
total to receive all services during an episode, despite receiving the same or
fewer visits and ancillary services. The patterns of avoiding the gatekeeper
and using specialists, referrals, or cross-coverage may in part reflect more
complex but responsive behavior in view of the HMO's strategies to en-
courage appropriate provider use. HMO patients might not have seen their
assigned gatekeeper physician because (1) they visited midlevel providers
instead; (2) their assigned physicians sometimes referred them to specialists
without a visit; and (3) cross-coverage within the same division was common
for urgently requested visits and, using our definition, was more easily iden-
tified among the HMO patients. Further, FFS patients' easier direct access
to subspecialists included inappropriate contacts, leading to higher rates of
subspecialist care and lower rates of referral by generalists.
Hypothesis Two. DoesHMO Insurance Affect Overall Outpatient
Resources?
We examine next whether organizational strategies, orHMO insurance
per se, resulted in lower total outpatient expenditures. Although disease-
specific episodes provide the most important adjustment for health, we also
adjusted for within-disease health when comparing HMO and FFS expen-
ditures. Health-related factors included basic demographic variables and
evidence of other or more serious disease (see Table 4 further on.)
To model the effect of witiin-disease health indicators on outpatient
resources, we used insurance to create two subgroups and regressed outpatient
resources (in 1990 logged dollars) on patient health for each subgroup. These
regressions yielded two estimates of outpatient resources for each episode:
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resources typically received by FFS or HMO patients, given the patient's
particular health attributes and the study disease being investigated.
Figure 1 shows a comparison of these estimates for back pain. The
coordinates for each square (a specific HMO episode) represent two esti-
mates: if it had received the care pattern for FFS (X-axis) or for HMO
(Y-axis). If the episode's estimates reflected the identical impact of health-
Figure 1: ComparingHMO and FFS Pattems ofOutpatient Resource
Use for Back Pain; Estimates Compared for 5,403 HMO Episodes
*
U,
S
Q
CU
0
w900
.0
0
$55 $150 $400 $1,100 $2,980
Logged Dollars Based on FFS Subgroup Estimates*
*Based on Resources of Standardized 1990 Dollars (Logged) on Health Factors by
Insurance Subgroup.
$20
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related factors regardless of insurance, then each square should be aligned
along the diagonal-reflecting only the conclusion that greater resources are
spent on "sicker" patients.
As readily observed in Figure 1, a strong overall trend indicated that
patients with poorer health were receiving more total resources regardless of
their insurance. However, also apparent is that most squares fell below the
diagonal, indicating that disproportionately more resources would have been
spent for the same patient with an episode of back pain if the patient had had
FFS insurance. For back pain and for all six other diseases, HMO patients
received statistically significantly fewer outpatient resources, controlling for
health and study disease (p < .000 1, based on paired t-tests, comparingHMO
and FFS estimates for each episode).
We also tested whether this effect was linear for each disease, that is,
whether or not having HMO insurance reduced resource use by a constant
amount, depending only on patients' health. Figure 1 also displays the curvi-
linear fit line for back pain, regressing the FFS-based estimate and its square
on the HMO-based estimate for all HMO episodes. Curvilinear effects of
insurance were significant for all seven diseases (p < .00001 for the coefficient
for each squared term).
For all diseases, these results suggest that the effect of having HMO
insurance was not a simple reduction of resources, directly proportionate to
those needed because of the patient's specific disease and health-related
factors. Instead the effect ofHMO insurance varied, depending on how sick
the patient was. Our estimates suggest that FFS and HMO patterns of care
tended to be similar at both extremes of health; that is, the healthiest and
the sickest patients received similar care, with some evidence that the sickest
HMO patients tended to receive more resources than the sickest FFS patients.
The differences in care, that is, the "savings" observed for episodes of treating
HMO patients with a specific disease, appear to occur primarily when treating
patients with "average" overall health problems.
Last, we use three models to regress total outpatient resources onHMO
insurance, controlling for (1) nothing else, (2) patient health-related factors,
and (3) patient health and the specialty ofthe physician first seeing the patient,
that is, one important factor underlying many of the HMO's strategies to
influence costs. Table 4 presents results for low back pain; tables for all diseases
are available upon request.
Model 1 corresponds to the total observable effect of HMO care on
outpatient resources, regardless of whether the effect is due to the insurance
per se and/or to differences in the health ofHMO patients, in who treated
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Table 4: Three Models of Impact ofHMO Insurance on Outpatient
Resource Use; Regression on 1990 Standardized Dollars (Logged) for
Care of Back Pain (n = 10,484)
Model 2: Model 3: Add
Model 1: Adjustfor lst Provider's
HMO Alone Case Mix Specialy_beta and sig. beta and sig. beta and sig.
Patient Charactristics at Episode
Insured by HMO (compared to FFS)
Health-related factors (case mix)
Age
Age2
Sex
No. secondary diagnoses
No. unrelated diagnoses
No. prior episodes of same disease
Presence of outpatient procedure
Related hospitalization episode
Hospital-diagnosis interaction
Time trend by quarter
F and significance of adjusting for case mix
Speciaty ofPhysician First Visited (compared to
adult medicine)
Family practice and pediatricians
Specialty that can be HMO-assigned doctor
Specialty that cannot be HMO-assigned doctor
Surgeons
Emergency Room physicians
F and significance of adjusting for provider
specialty
F and significance of entire equation
Total R2
-.041***
.073***
.163***
.186***
.053***
160.1 10***
152.305*** 126.258*** 143.431***
.014 .117 .180
*p <
.01; **p < .001; ***p < .0001.
them, or in unmeasured confounders (Davis 1985; Stolzenberg 1980). Model
1 in Table 4 shows that the overall effect of havingHMO insurance resulted
in the patient receiving significantly fewer outpatient resources for back pain
than with FFS care. This finding was also significant for four other diseases
(all except eczema and bronchitis).
Model 2 adjusts for patient health-related factors on outpatient re-
sources as well as HMO insurance. We tested for the significance of adding
the set of health-related factors by examining the change in F compared
.131*
-.029
-.017
.093**
.142***
-.006
.226**
-.015
-.022
-.002
121.896**
.047
.030
-.009
.087***
.162***
-.003
.220**
-.015
-.024*
.003
94 HSR: Health Services Research 33:1 (April 1998)
to F in Model 1. For back pain and for all other study diseases, this set
of factors added significantly (p < .0001) to the explanatory power of the
overall equation for predicting resources used. Using Model 2 (adjusting for
patient health), HMO insurance predicted that patients received significantly
fewer resources for treatment of back pain, esophagitis, eczema, and acute
otitis media.
In Model 3, we added the specialty of the physician first visited during
the episode. Based on the change in F from Model 2, specialty added signif-
icantly to the overall prediction of resources for all diseases (Table 4). After
controlling for health and insurance, family practitioners and pediatricians
spent significantly less for back pain than did adult medicine (internists, GPs)
while surgeons, ER physicians, and specialists spent significantly more. This
general pattern for providers' specialty held across all seven diseases.
Of particular interest is what happened to the standardized coefficient
(beta) for the HMO in Model 3 in contrast to the other models. For back
pain, inclusion of the provider's specialty in Model 3 reduced the magnitude
of the beta for HMO considerably in comparison to Models 1 and 2. This
same pattern, significant reduction in the HMO's explanatory contribution
in Model 3 compared to the other models, held across all seven diseases; in
fact, the HMO became insignificantly different from FFS in Model 3 for all
diseases except back pain. These results suggest thatHMO insurance did not
have a direct effect on resources (for instance, by influencing each physician
to treatHMO patients differently), but instead reduced use by organizational
strategies (by influencing who treated HMO patients).
COMMENTS
Our study yielded three important findings. First, the HMO influenced pa-
tient and provider behavior by using patient-oriented and physician-oriented
strategies to reduce care. As intended, HMO patients with the same disease
as their FFS counterparts made more use of lower-cost providers (more
midlevel providers and generalists), avoided higher-cost providers (fewer
specialists and ER visits), and received arguably more cost-effective services
(less expensive ancillary services and more selective use of specialists).
Second, besides affecting rates of use, we found for all seven diseases
thatHMO care used fewer expenditures-expressed as total outpatient dollars
and adjusted for within-disease health, that is, case mix. For all seven diseases,
we found evidence that the HMO's effect on expenditures was curvlinear,
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varying by patients' health. Our results suggest that most of the savings
occurred for the patients with average health and that the healthiest and sickest
patients tended to receive the same total outpatient resources regardless of
insurance.
Third, we found evidence that having HMO insurance did not reduce
case mix-adjusted expenditures by influencing each physician to treatHMO
and FFS patients differently. Instead our results suggested that this effect
occurred viaHMO strategies that influenced which physicians treated HMO
patients. The impact of organizational strategies may have been observed
precisely because this setting did not reward physicians differently at the
individual level. In any case, our results suggest that HMOs can achieve
significant outpatient savings without requiring each provider to change his
or her clinical decisions depending on patient insurance.
Are these outpatient savings significant? Some have argued that out-
patient savings are not important-that managed care achieves its savings
by reducing inpatient care, especially by having fewer hospitalizations-and
that nothing else much matters because hospitalizations are so costly. How can
policymakers and administrators best judge how important these outpatient
"savings" truly are?
To address this question in our setting, we focused on the four study
diseases with the most hospitalizations overall (bronchitis, acute otitis media,
esophagitis, and gastritis) in order to better estimate inpatient resources,
controlling for case mix, from our data. Our standardized 1990 inpatient costs
were independent of insurance and included daily room and other hospital
charges and all associated professional fees.
HMO patients were hospitalized less often, so perhaps we should focus
on how much a forgone hospitalization would have cost: $5,456 on average
for these four diseases. Yet to take into account that most patients were never
hospitalized for these diseases regardless of insurance, the per-episode rate
may be more instructive: our average per-episode savings for these four
diseases was $5.27 for inpatient care compared to $10.26 for outpatient
care-leading to twice the overall savings from outpatient costs. For patients
under 65 with these four problems in our setting during this 3.5-year period,
these per-episode savings summed to $321,820 for outpatient charges versus
$165,367 for inpatient hospital and professional fees. Since most problems
never lead to hospitalization, perhaps it is time to rethink where the greatest
overall savings may reside.
The key strengths of this study relate to the unusual opportunities
to examine the independent effect of organizational strategies, above and
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beyond the method through which providers were reimbursed. Because the
encounter datawere collected and priced identically for all patients, regardless
of provider or insurance, and were standardized to 1990 dollars, the capacity
to truly compare services forHMO and FFS patients is exceptional. Because
the physicians' incentives were identical for HMO and FFS patients at the
provider level, we can ignore this potential influence on services delivered.
Likewise, because HMO and FFS patients could visit the same physicians
and use the same facilities, we avoid biases plaguing others' comparisons of
HMO and FFS rates involving different providers and facilities.
Another strength is the usefulness of these encounter data to construct
episodes of acute illnesses commonly treated in ambulatory settings and
to adjust for witiin-disease case mix. Using short episodes maximized the
comparability ofHMO and FFS care because neither set ofpatients was likely
to seek out-of-Clinic care during this short period. Any remaining biases due
to incomplete capturing of FFS care caused us to understate FFS care so that
our results would underestimate true expenditure reductions under HMO
insurance.
The explanatory case design of our setting brings limitations too. When
the researcher has little opportunity to exert control, such designs are espe-
cially well suited to take advantage of controls built into the setting. However,
they do not permit statistically sound generlizability to other settings, for
example, to a population of patients, other providers or group practices,
or other HMOs (Yin 1994). Our patient population, although it represents
100,000 episodes of acute illnesses involving 1.5 million provider encoun-
ters, did not include those insured under Medicaid or Medicare and was
predominantly white, middle-income, and living in a small urban area. Our
providers included many family practitioners and a variety of specialists not
available in many group practices. This HMO represented specific solutions
for passing financial risk to its providers and for strategies to reduce costs.
Since these encounters occurred in the late 1980s, the estimates do not reflect
new medical practices or new market pressures. Drug use was not analyzed
because comparably complete data were not available for FFS patients.
Because we chose diseases treated primarily in outpatients, we did not focus
on diseases with high rates of hospitalization or compare usage of preventive
or maintenance services, nor did we capture patients who never came to the
Clinic. Although we had a large and complex database, we may not have
compensated fully for health differences between HMO and FFS patients
or for other variables that might have led HMO patients to prefer midlevel
providers or generalists. Our findings of reduced expenditures do not reflect
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"true savings" based on actual prices paid by insurers or on out-of-pocket
expenditures paid by patients.
Perhaps most importantly, we cannot address whether lower resource
use was related to differences in satisfaction or to outcomes of care. Especially
because of increased concerns about public loss of trust in the doctor-patient
relationship under managed care (Emanuel and Dubler 1995; Mechanic
and Schlesinger 1996), it will be important to understand whether HMO
organizational strategies lead to more cost-effective care or simply to lower
costs with less satisfactory or lower-quality outcomes.
Our results suggest that the promises of HMOs require neither physi-
cian-specific incentives, nor alterations in the clinical decisions of each prac-
titioner, nor asking individual clinicians to practice two-tiered medicine. In-
stead cost-effective care can be the outcome of a process in which appropriate
financial incentives for providers and patients and system features, together
with provider and patient acculturation, come together. In an era of increas-
ing enthusiasm to encourage HMOs and managed care, it is imperative to
develop a more sophisticated understanding of the ways in which HMO
incentives truly work to achieve their savings and to learn to appreciate
the power of complex organizations and systems to design and create de-
sirable results.
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